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Abstract—As currently classical malware detection methods 
based on signatures fail to detect new malware, they are not 
always efficient with new obfuscation techniques. Besides, new 
malware is easily created and old malware can be recoded to 
produce new one. Therefore, classical Antivirus becomes 
consistently less effective in dealing with those new threats. Also 
malware gets hand tailored to bypass network security and 
Antivirus. But as analysts do not have enough time to dissect 
suspected malware by hand, automated approaches have been 
developed. To cope with the mass of new malware, statistical and 
machine learning methods proved to be a good approach 
classifying programs, especially when using multiple approaches 
together to provide a likelihood of software being malicious. In 
normal approach, some steps have been taken, mostly by 
analyzing the opcodes or mnemonics of disassembly and their 
distribution. In this paper, we focus on the control flow change 
(CFC) itself and finding out if it is significant to detect malware. 
In the scope of this work, only relative control flow changes are 
contemplated, as these are easier to extract from the first chosen 
disassembler library and are within a range of 256 addresses. 
These features are analyzed as a raw feature, as n-grams of 
length 2, 4 and 6 and the even more abstract feature of the 
occurrences of the n-grams is used. Statistical methods were used 
as well as the Naïve-Bayes algorithm to find out if there is 
significant data in CFC. We also test our approach with real-
world datasets.   
Keywords— Malware analysis, Control flow change, Naïve-
Bayes analysis, n-gram signatures  
I. INTRODUCTION  
The world of computer crime is constantly expanding. Due 
to constantly new tech-nology is invading our lives, the 
opportunities of making money by exploiting tech-nologies' 
vulnerabilities rise in the same way. At the same time, classical 
antivirus (AV) products seem to fail against new coded 
malware [1], which incorporates rootkit technologies and gets 
encoded to subvert AV products. Classical AV relies greatly on 
file signatures, providing which is a reactive process of finding 
a malware, creating a signature (for example by hashing or 
extracting byte sequences) and pushing these signatures into 
file/system scanners. For institutions like the police or military, 
this approach is no more feasible, as the attackers have become 
more proficient and equipped and institutions face a constant 
stream of sophisticated attacks. 
Therefore, new automated methods of discern between 
wanted software (so-called “goodware”) and unwanted 
software (“malware”) ought to be explored to battle the stream 
of malware. Interesting approaches have been taken in the past 
and lead to systems for automatic detection and categorization 
of malware, such as sandboxes or intrusion prevention systems. 
Current approaches have been taken to use statistical analysis 
[2] or machine learning [3] to find discriminators for 
categorization. As the analysis of microprocessor operation 
code (opcode) has been subject of some research and some 
approaches have been suggested for analysing the control flow, 
in this paper we focus on relative change of control flow in 
static disassembly. This approach has not been proposed in the 
literature yet, so our work aims on testing if the use of control 
flow change can be used to differentiate between goodware and 
malware. The precondition for our approach is that the 
software in question is not packed, encrypted or encoded. 
Software unpacking, decryption or decoding is beyond the 
scope of this work, however, simple steps in sorting out such 
samples have been taken. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 
shows background of our research and related work in this 
area. We present our approach in Section 3. We describe and 
analyse results in Section 4. Finally, we conclude and discuss 
on future work in Section 5. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Windows PE files 
The PE file format is the main format of Microsoft 
Windows executable files, dynamic link libraries and object 
code. It contains all information needed for the program loader 
of the Windows operating system to build the process object, 
the memory layout and needed library call structures. It is 
derived from the Unix COFF file format. The supported 
architectures of the PE file format are IA-32, IA-64, x86-64 
and ARM. This work focuses on the IA-32 architecture. The 
full documentation of the PE file format can be found in 
Microsofts “Microsoft PE and COFF Specification” [4]. The 
code of the executable can be extracted from the sections part 
of the PE file in raw form using the section table information. 
In this paper, the executable segments of a program are 
extracted from the PE file using the “pefile”-library for python 
by Ero Carrera [5]. 
B. Interactive DisAssembler (IDA) 
Disassembling a compiled program is the process of 
translating an executable pro-gram into an equivalent 
mnemonic representation, which is human-readable. It is the 
inverse operation of an assembler. Generally, disassembling is 
done by having a reference of the opcode bytes as the “Intel® 
64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer Manuals” 
(Intel Corporation 2014) and by looking up the opcodes, 
assigning the appropriate mnemonic with the corresponding 
operands. In this work, the process of disassembling is done by 
the python library “distorm3” [6]. The disassembler library is 
used to distinguish the operations against each other, as x86 
operations are not aligned to a specific length and therefore not 
trivially detectable. The second disassembler used is the 
Interactive DisAssembler (IDA) Pro by Ilfak Guilfanov[7] in 
Version 6.2.0111006. IDA supports multiple architectures and 
binary formats. The disassembler was modified by an .idc 
script to automatically provide an opcode listing as well as the 
mnemonic representation. Figure 1 shows an excerpt of the 
listing exported by IDA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. IDA listing, excerpt from AdapterTroubleshooter.exe 
C. Control flow change (CFC) and n-gram 
In our approach, it is assumed that control flow changes 
differ between malware and goodware. As malware has to test 
many variables in an infected system, such as testing for 
antivirus software, potentially interesting data or evaluating 
data collected for example by keyboard sniffers, in this work it 
is expected that CFC patterns differ between goodware and 
malware. If this is the case, statistical methods will show if this 
difference can be used to classify unknown software as 
goodware and malware. The methods used in our approach to 
find a discriminator between malware and goodware include 
the statistical values of the median, the variance, the variance 
coefficient and the spread.    
Another approach to find a discriminator is to use a 
classifier. The Naive Bayes Classifier[8] is expected to perform 
well, being relatively simple to implement and having good 
detection rates. The Naive Bayes Classifier is derived from the 
Bayes' Theorem. In this work, the CFC features are treated like 
words as input for the Naive Bayes Classifier. The classifier is 
trained with goodware and malware and afterwards, selected 
goodware and malware samples are tested using the 
classificatory. 
Also the n-gram method is used in this work. An n-gram is 
a contiguous sequence of letters, a substring of a larger word or 
text. The “n” is designating the length of the contiguous 
sequence. The word “word”, for example, can be broken into 
the 2-grams (or bigrams) “wo”, “or” and “rd”.  
D. Related work 
Bilar [2] describes the method of gathering statistical data 
about opcode distribution in assembly, using this to predict if a 
program is malware. The opcode frequencies of 67 malware 
samples and 20 non-malicious programs were evaluated. 
Therefore the malware was classified by unknown methods 
into the class kernel-mode rootkit, usermode rootkit, tool, bot, 
trojan, virus and worm. The instructions were counted by the 
IDAPro disassembler plugin InstructionCounter and 
statistically examined by a Java program. The analysis was 
performed inside a virtual machine using VMWare Player to 
contain the malware samples. The common opcodes (opcodes 
frequently seen in software) did not prove to be a strong 
predictor for malware, “about 70% of the cells exhibited 
similar, 30% higher and 10% lower opcode frequencies”, 
where “cells” are the malware opcode frequencies in the 
different malware “groups” like trojan or rootkit. The results 
also indicate a significant difference between the mal-ware 
classes and goodware in the more infrequent opcodes, 
classifying them as a strong predictor for malware. As this 
approach has proven the value of statistical data in opcode 
distribution, this work incorporates the idea. 
This method is refined by Santos et al. [3], who use 
machine learning methods to detect unknown malware 
samples. It is proven that machine learning can successfully be 
applied to opcode frequency data to distinguish between 
malware and good software with low false positive ratios. The 
frequency of opcode sequences is used as a vector 
representation of the program executables. This approach is 
used in this work as well with the frequency of the extracted n-
grams. Methods used are the Decision Tree classifier, different 
types of Support Vector Machines, K-Nearest Neighbours with 
K varying from 1 to 10, the Naive Bayes Algorithm and 
Bayesian Networks. The opcode sequence contemplated is 1 or 
2, as well as the combined likelihoods of both. It is proven that 
the method used “provides a good detection ratio of unknown 
malware while keeping a low false positive ratio” [2]. 
A similar approach is taken by Kang et al. [9]. This 
approach focuses at the mnemonic rather than the opcode and 
therefore subsumes similar operations (for example xor 0x30-
0x35) presenting stronger statistical data due to abstraction. 
Kang et al. make use of Intels PIN library[10] for the dynamic 
approach, so the assembly is extracted out of the running 
program. The library runs executable code and breaks on every 
branch, so custom code can be run. This is an approach to 
counter packed malware. 
Ding et al. [11] further improve this method by looking at 
the control flow changes. Code blocks (“basic blocks”) can be 
identified and the exact opcode sequence and therefore distinct 
execution paths can be recovered. These execution paths can 
be split into n-grams of consecutive opcodes using the sliding 
window method. A database of these n-grams can be built, 
 
optimizing the n-gram size (although only 3-grams are covered 
for performance reasons). The n-grams with the highest 
information gain are selected as features and used to categorize 
malware. 
Another method of malware detection is by using n-gram 
signatures of files [12]. N-grams, which are a substring of 
length n of a string, are extracted out of files and used as an 
input for a k-nearest-neighbour algorithm, which then classifies 
a test set for prior learned sample sets of goodware and 
malware. Unfortunately, the exact feature extracted is not clear. 
The extracted n-gram data provided to be a usable 
classification feature with a best ratio without false positives of 
74,37% malware detection ratio using 4-grams and 17 most 
alike malware files (nearest neighbours). Therefore, in our 
approach, we focus on 2-grams, 4-grams and 6-grams.    
III. TOWARD A NEW APPROACH OF CLASSIFY MALWARE 
A. Problem statement 
In Section 2, the current approach in literature adopted has 
been based on the opcode frequency, mnemonic frequency and 
opcode n-grams to classify programs as malware and 
goodware. By extracting statistical data about both groups, it is 
shown that there is a difference in the statistical distribution of 
certain features between malware and goodware. It is also 
shown that all approaches, the classical statistical one [2] and 
the advanced ones, for example Naive Bayes or clustering 
[3][12], are promising. However, there are more features in 
assembly code which can be extracted. Our approach focuses 
on the change in control flow, namely the relative jump and 
call opcodes and their parameters. These features are extracted 
from samples of malware and goodware and it is tested if 
relative control flow change can be used as a discriminator 
between these groups. If it is, it will be shown how statistics 
about control flow change perform against the statistical 
analysis of opcodes. This exact feature has not been subject to 
research before, therefore multiple methods are tested. The 
objective of our research is to test if there is a significant 
difference in control flow change between goodware and 
malware. Therefore it is assumed that CFC patterns differ 
between goodware and malware. If this is the case, statistical 
methods will show if this difference can be used to classify 
unknown software as goodware and malware. The feature is 
furthermore thought of as a classificator for program families 
(both goodware and malware) or library use in programs, 
which will be subject of further research. Hereby, it is known 
that the expression of control flow change lies mostly in the 
hands of the compiler, but as malware authors tend to stick 
with the compiler they used before, this is seen as a minor 
problem for this work but a topic for further research if 
successful. 
Also the use of anti-debugging techniques in malware 
ought to pose a problem. This problem is to be addressed by 
improving disassembling techniques. In prior re-search this has 
been a problem too. For the disassembly process, IDA was 
used in most of the works where the disassembler was 
mentioned. As the opcodes were extracted as features and a 
significant result has been found, IDA is also expected for 
disassembly to be reliable enough to extract statistical data and 
to pose a problem to be addressed in disassembly research. 
These challenges are connected to another challenge in 
disassembly, the occurrence of data within the disassemble 
area. As this occurred during the research the disassembler was 
changed from distorm3 to IDA. Furthermore, the control flow 
changes are used as base text for the n-gram method. N-grams 
have proven to be a usable feature by Santos et al. [12], 
therefore this approach has been chosen to abstract from the 
raw CFC data for testing the n-gram method further. The 
extracted n-grams are reviewed using methods as in the former 
research. 
B. Proposed Approach 
The Zeus and Citadel malware among other less known 
samples for this work have been obtained from the malware 
archive of the University of Bonn. Also the parts of the 
malware database of contagio.blogspot.de [15] and nothink.org 
[16] are also chosen in our analysis. According to the archive 
owners, the malware chosen from their archives ought to be 
unpacked. All files chosen for this work are in the Microsoft 
PE format. 
As the sample set for goodware, we chose executable 
smaller than 1MB and not named “x86_microsoft*” of the 
windows system directory of a Windows 7 SP 1 x32 with a 
patch level of 20.02.2014. These executables represent 
programs changing parameters in the operating system and 
accessing operating system functions and are therefore thought 
to be most similar to malware in wanted, “good” software. So 
if significant CFC differences can be found, the CFC approach 
should work even better with software not performing work on 
operating system level. The files “named x86_microsoft*” 
were omitted because these files are remains of Microsoft 
Windows updates and therefore not representative for normal 
windows applications. 
At first every sample was tested if it is a PE/COFF 
executable by the pefile library. Nonparseable executables 
were discarded/skipped. The section characteristics in the PE 
header were tested for executable sections and these sections 
were extracted. The extracted sections were then tested for 
entropy [11]. According to “Using Entropy Analysis to Find 
Encrypted and Packed Malware” [13], “Using a 99.99 percent 
confidence level, executables with an average entropy and a 
highest entropy block value of greater than 6.677 and 7.199, 
respectively, are statistically likely to be packed or encrypted” 
[13]. Therefore, executable sections with entropy larger than 
6.677 were also discarded automatically. Although this 
approach ignores the possibility of false negatives, it is 
accepted due to the time consumption of manual analysis and 
the error handling of IDA. False positives in the former 
methods just would lead to a piece of code not being taken into 
account for good/malware. This also is acceptable, because if 
the base of data is too small, more samples would be used. The 
code sections left over by these filters are automatically 
disassembled using distorm DecodeGenerator in Version 
0x030300. The code is returned as a list of offset, size, 
instruction in human readable form and hexdump, so it can be 
used to match opcodes in hexadecimal as well as mnemonics. 
The single operations are then analysed by opcode. If an 
opcode causes a control flow change the address is extracted 
and appended with its control flow change length to a list for 
this opcode. The development and analysis took place on a 
virtual machine using VMWare Workstation 10.0 on a 
Microsoft Windows 7 x64 host. The VM runs elementary OS 
Luna kernel 3.2.0-63. Used python version is 2.7.3, but the 
programs were also tested on 2.7.5. 
As problems were encountered during the work, a second 
disassembler was chosen to cope with strings and data in the 
executable segment. Many zero-length control flow changes 
and therefore many zero n-grams were seen. As zero-length 
jumps are seen in normal code too (but very scarcely, possibly 
for hot-patching reasons), the number of these CFC observed 
was very high. Some samples were loaded manually into IDA 
Pro and searched for the zero-length CFC in question. As none 
have been seen, it was observed that two-byte unicode strings 
featured some of the CFC in question, such as “0x75 0x00” 
(jump on not equal 0) are part of for example “0x00 0x75 0x00 
0x70”, forming unicode “up”. To cope with this disassembly 
misinterpretation, another disassembler was used and some of 
the feature extraction and statistics code were rewritten. The 
product chosen is the IDA Pro Version 6.2.0111006 
Disassembler by hex-rays. IDA was run on Windows 7 x64 
SP1 Updates to 26.02.2015. For feeding the goodware and 
malware samples into IDA, python 2.7.5 for Windows was 
used. The listings were collected by the script and then copied 
to the Linux analysis VM. As IDA by itself does not support 
export of assembly listings including opcodes as parsable text, 
the following changes were made. 
For our work, only relative control flow changes are 
contemplated. The structure generated by the collector program 
is a dictionary of opcode bytes as key, containing a list 
containing the opcode frequency and the address and jump 
length pairs. In case of distorm3 this structure is wrapped in a 
dictionary with the section- and filename as keys, containing 
also the relative virtual address (RVA), lines of code and 
entropy for further analysis. 
Using IDA, the structure is the same; however neither RVA 
nor the entropy is calculated. Instead, RVA is set to 0 and 
entropy is set to 1 so it is possible to find out what 
disassembler was used by reading the output file. The whole 
dictionary is saved to a binary file in pickle format, so it can be 
retrieved to the original python data structures by other 
programs. The pickle module is an algorithm to serialize 
python objects, in this work it is used to write and read python 
objects to and from files. In a separate program, statistical 
features are calculated for the instructions “jump on condition” 
and relative call (0xe8) using this data structures. For each 
executable section, the following statistical numbers are 
calculated [8][14]: spread (smallest to largest value), the 
variance, the medians, the median divided by the maximum of 
the values minus the minimum of the values, the variance 
coefficient. All statistical data is sorted by value. To check if 
there is a significant difference in the distribution of the 
statistical values of goodware and malware, the Spearmans 
rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's Rho) test is applied to 
the distinct value pairs (positive and negative). Spearman's Rho 
was chosen because the data is in form of a continuous 
distribution. If the distribution of values of malware is a 
monotonous function of the distribution of values of goodware 
the value does not qualify as a statistically significant 
discriminator between the groups of malware and goodware. 
Therefore, the zero hypothesis was chosen as a perfect 
correlation between malware and goodware of all statistical 
values. 
The second approach for finding a discriminator was to use 
a Naive Bayes Classifier to test unknown software against the 
sample datasets. An own Naive Bayes Classifier was 
developed on base of an implementation of Thomas Uhrig 
[19], which then was trained with the sample sets (574 
goodware and 94 malware samples) of raw jump length data. 
Test software (both malware and goodware) was then tested 
against the data. The input for the Naive Bayes Algorithm was 
the length of the data of the raw control flow change of jump 
on condition (jcc, e.g. jz, jump on zero). The sample set of 
malware and goodware samples has been used to train the 
Naive Bayes Algorithm (training set) and 14 elements of 
malware and 4 elements of goodware programs have been 
tested against the learned data. The later chosen approach is 
based on the extraction of n-grams of words from a text, 
correspondingly jump length sequences of a code segment 25. 
The n-gram is the continuous sequence of n jump lengths from 
the list of control flow changes. The n-grams are extracted by 
choice of the user and written to a Sqlite database for easy 
comparison and further statistical handling. Two sample 
databases were chosen, one containing n-grams of 626 samples 
of goodware and another one containing n-grams of 95 samples 
of malware. Test samples were treated using the same process 
and were put into a separate database. The categorization test 
searches for occurrence of the to-test n-grams in the sample 
datasets and showed if conformities are found. 
A second program extracts the n-grams by file; saving it in 
a pickle format file so further processing can be done with the 
n-grams belonging to the single files. The diversity in data 
formats (Sqlite versus pickle) is due to Sqlite being processable 
by non-python software for further research. For the further 
tests, the malware training dataset was increased to 535 
samples, including samples of the then-new Equation 
campaign. Formerly done tests were repeated but the results 
did not differ significantly from the former results. Both 
database formats were used with the Naive Bayes Classifier, 
modified to classify n-grams. The classifier was trained with 
the goodware and malware Sqlite databases, drawing 
likelihood data for the whole set of n-grams. Then the test 
sample was tested against the classifier. Therefore, the n-grams 
of the single files needed to be identifiable. The classification 
likelihood for the goodware and malware classes is shown as in 
the first approach to the Bayesian Classifier. For this 
experiment, 2-, 4-, and 6-gram sets were created and tested. It 
was also tested how many n-grams are exclusive to goodware 
or malware and how many occur in both sample sets. The 
approach of using the n-grams themselves as a feature was 
omitted due to the unsatisfying results. 
The further approach was to count the occurrences of the n-
grams, choose a varia-ble length of the most frequently 
occurrences and use the frequency as a feature to feed into 
Naive Bayes for classification. The occurrences of the n-grams 
themselves also were counted for use as an even more indirect 
feature. 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
In this section, we describe our experiments of 
classification goodware and malware based on two methods: 
statistical and Naïve Bayes analysis on the length of jump on 
condition (jcc).. 
A. Statistical analysis 
For the statistical analysis, the following measures of jcc 
have been chosen: the spread, the variance, the medians, the 
median divided by the maximum of the values minus the 
minimum of the values, the variance coefficient and the 
frequencies. As an overview, the average values of these 
statistical numbers are presented in Table 1. 
TABLE I.  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF JCC FOR GOODWARE AND 
MALWARE 
 Goodware Malware 
Spread 116 124 
Scatter 27.02 31.63 
Medians 18.18 20.99 
Medians/Spread 0.17 0.17 
Variance Coefficient 0.94 0.97 
Frequencies 974 3373 
 
All of these values were collected from the selected 
goodware samples and com-pared against the values collected 
from the malware samples. We found high correla-tion 
between goodware and malware for these statistical measures. 
In Table 1, the difference of all measures between the 
goodware and the malware is relative small except the 
frequencies. So, at the first stage, opcode frequency can be 
used as a classifier of goodware/malware, but this has been 
covered in prior research. 
B. Naïve-Bayes 
For the Naive Bayes Classifier 14 samples of malware test 
data and 4 pieces of goodware test data were chosen. The 
classifier is trained for the dataset of jcc instruction. The 
training set included 620 samples of goodware and 94 samples 
of malware. The results of the jcc tests of the Naive Bayes 
Classifier are shown in Figure 2 and 3. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Naïve Bayes classifier likelihoods for jcc goodware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Naïve Bayes classifier likelihoods for jcc malware 
As the n-grams were extracted from the raw CFC data, the 
next step was to use the n-gram data as an input for the Naive 
Bayes Classifier. The classifier used above was altered to 
process n-gram data instead of raw CFCs and run against the 
same dataset as above 620 samples of goodware and 94 
samples of malware. In Figure 4 and 5 the results for 2-grams 
for goodware and malware are shown. Looking at these 
figures, we notice that the likelihoods of this classifier 
produces extremely low likelihoods for 2-gram. Most of the 
values are 0. We obtained the similar results with 4-gram and 
6-gram experiments. Besides, from the statistical analysis in 
Section IV.A, we found that frequency is an important metric. 
It was observed that some n-grams appear more than once in a 
file and the frequency of occurrence was also recorded in the 
data files produced above. This occurrence data can now be 
used as a feature to abstract from the actual n-gram, which may 
differ because of compiler or encoder used. It was further 
reviewed if this feature can be used as a discriminator for 
identifying malware. The classifier was altered to filter this 
range of frequency and applied. Figures 6 and 7 show the 
testing results of the 10-50 frequency 2-grams. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Naïve Bayes classifier likelihoods for jcc goodware 2-gram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Naïve Bayes classifier likelihoods for jcc malware 2-gram 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Naïve Bayes classifier likelihoods for jcc goodware 2-gram frequency 
 
 
 frequency 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Naïve Bayes classifier likelihoods for jcc malware 2-gram frequency 
filename prob. good prob. bad length of data
aspnet_compiler.lst 1.85E-028 4.97E-016 140
bootcfg.lst 6.08E-056 5.89E-034 1595
AdapterTroubleshooter.lst 8.80E-006 2.25E-006 110
BrmfRsmg.lst 8.77E-032 1.88E-019 641  
filename prob. good prob. bad length of data
bfb27f14234725a8f0146957953205ed.lst 2.25E-078 7.12E-045 4659
1fd05f3185733f03e71543c0e27d7740.lst 2.78E-077 3.37E-044 4807
0ec0f4be802b39a51c69bb0307a9629e.lst 3.17E-077 3.64E-044 4863
ff230a338ac820d73770411bab0013df.lst 1.16E-074 1.84E-042 4393
6a8d6aec6af71a9ef65f4e1ac44da94b.lst 5.84E-078 1.47E-044 4804
8f316e19714bad573af0f1116115cc33.lst 2.78E-077 3.37E-044 4805
7e941465c1b5396697e9a2bebefe775c.lst 8.15E-078 9.71E-045 4915
31f192e2e086723408ffc013bf546cbd.lst 3.05E-078 6.58E-045 4815
9ecc6d7904710fd0b45926ae535a2529.lst 2.78E-077 3.37E-044 4806
6fcc3a8b55376793f2985efbcb0123c8.lst 4.68E-077 3.97E-044 4861
4c6a9aaaae5ec8cbb430a969bb17849c.lst 8.81E-077 7.62E-044 4533
2fa2cbb2d273ab21aa1e10a6b314484f.lst 2.78E-077 3.37E-044 4802
5a304d1f64643b9501f5d43a67460ca5.lst 2.78E-077 3.37E-044 4805
425554e39f37bb5af1d8280e6fdd563d.lst 2.20E-077 4.58E-044 4588  
filename prob. good prob. bad length of data
aspnet_compiler.lst 5.37E-127 1.22E-130 266
bootcfg.lst 0 0 2913
AdapterTroubleshooter.lst 7.86E-026 2.50E-043 209
BrmfRsmg.lst 0 1.18E-246 1149  
filename prob. good prob. bad length of data
aspnet_compiler.lst 0.5966469428 0.4033530572 0
bootcfg.lst 0.3239472531 1.1409411736 19
AdapterTroubleshooter.lst 0.5966469428 4.03E-001 0
BrmfRsmg.lst 0.1470200482 1.87E-001 2  
filename prob. good prob. bad length of data
bfb27f14234725a8f0146957953205ed.lst 1.23E-011 6.36E-007 263
1fd05f3185733f03e71543c0e27d7740.lst 1.05E-010 2.77E-006 289
0ec0f4be802b39a51c69bb0307a9629e.lst 9.15E-011 1.89E-006 294
ff230a338ac820d73770411bab0013df.lst 2.04E-009 1.95E-005 207
6a8d6aec6af71a9ef65f4e1ac44da94b.lst 1.05E-010 2.77E-006 288
8f316e19714bad573af0f1116115cc33.lst 1.05E-010 2.77E-006 288
7e941465c1b5396697e9a2bebefe775c.lst 1.05E-010 2.77E-006 300
31f192e2e086723408ffc013bf546cbd.lst 1.05E-010 2.77E-006 289
9ecc6d7904710fd0b45926ae535a2529.lst 3.81E-010 7.74E-006 288
6fcc3a8b55376793f2985efbcb0123c8.lst 1.56E-010 3.40E-006 306
4c6a9aaaae5ec8cbb430a969bb17849c.lst 1.41E-008 4.64E-005 260
2fa2cbb2d273ab21aa1e10a6b314484f.lst 1.05E-010 2.77E-006 288
5a304d1f64643b9501f5d43a67460ca5.lst 1.05E-010 2.77E-006 288
425554e39f37bb5af1d8280e6fdd563d.lst 1.41E-008 5.54E-005 249  
filename prob. good prob. bad length of data
bfb27f14234725a8f0146957953205ed.lst 0 0 14373
1fd05f3185733f03e71543c0e27d7740.lst 0 0 14877
0ec0f4be802b39a51c69bb0307a9629e.lst 0 0 15187
ff230a338ac820d73770411bab0013df.lst 0 0 13106
6a8d6aec6af71a9ef65f4e1ac44da94b.lst 0 0 14849
8f316e19714bad573af0f1116115cc33.lst 0 0 14851
7e941465c1b5396697e9a2bebefe775c.lst 0 0 15297
31f192e2e086723408ffc013bf546cbd.lst 0 0 14875
9ecc6d7904710fd0b45926ae535a2529.lst 0 0 14855
6fcc3a8b55376793f2985efbcb0123c8.lst 0 0 14916
4c6a9aaaae5ec8cbb430a969bb17849c.lst 0 0 13727
2fa2cbb2d273ab21aa1e10a6b314484f.lst 0 0 14840
5a304d1f64643b9501f5d43a67460ca5.lst 0 0 14853
425554e39f37bb5af1d8280e6fdd563d.lst 0 0 13923  
C. Discussion 
From the experiments described above, there is no 
significant difference in the statistical values between these two 
groups using the median, variance or spread or derivatives of 
these values of control flow change data, they also show that 
there is a correlation between the statistical data of the CFC of 
goodware and malware except their frequency.  
On the other hand, the experimental results show that data 
of the raw control flow change data used as training and test 
for a Naive Bayes Algorithm could not be used to distinguish 
malware from goodware. The reason is the goodware and 
malware samples were used as base “texts”. Therefore the CFC 
features as “words” for training the algorithm and test samples 
were tested in the same manner, but the low result likelihoods 
showed that the feature pool was too big and the single 
significant features too scarce. Also, focusing on the single 
CFC feature, programs to be tested have to have enough single 
CFC features to provide a reliable basis for the comparison or 
likelihood calculation, as for example the Naive Bayes 
Algorithm will provide low values if very few features 
compared to the learned features are present in the to-test 
samples. More detailed analysis of the CFC features and a 
selection of features can improve the results. 
Therefore, the use of more abstract features was tested, 
using the n-gram method to abstract from the raw CFC data. 
The n-grams were used to train the modified Naïve Bayes 
Algorithm and some data tested against it. Abstracting the data 
by extracting n-grams from the CFC data using 2-, 4- and 6-
grams did not improve the results. 
However, when looking at the frequency of the n-grams 
counted, it can improve the results from the raw CFC data. For 
example, the probability of goodware of 
AdapterTroubleshooter.lst (a goodware) is 0.59 vs. 0.004- its 
probability of malware. Looking at Figure 9, the probability of 
malware of all testing malwares is around 1000 times greater 
their probability of goodware. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we describe an approach of using the control 
flow change (CFC) itself and finding out if it is significant to 
classify ‘goodware’ and ‘malware’. Statistical methods were 
used as well as the Naïve-Bayes algorithm to find out if there is 
signifi-cant data in CFC. It also was shown that data of the raw 
control flow change data used as training and test for a Naive 
Bayes Algorithm could be exploited to distin-guish malware 
from goodware. However, the data found showed at least the 
single feature chosen in some programs has been too scarce to 
be usable, and if data was found, the likelihoods were too low 
to make a decision. It is discovered that by far most of the CFC 
features are seen once to 5 times. That means that the single 
feature does have low significance. Therefore, in possible 
further approaches, it has to be combined with other features 
(for example all CFCs together) or grouped by similari-ty. The 
using of frequency of the n-grams can be used to distinguish 
malware from goodware with an appropriate threshold. 
However the overall likelihood is still low. 
Therefore, in our further approach, using CFC could be to 
test if it can be used as a software family classifier or to detect 
code block or library reuse. Multiple confirmed samples of the 
same program family (e.g. malware families zeus or citadel) 
could be tested if the n-gram method reliably classifies these 
families together from test sets. We are also looking at 
advanced machine learning techniques such as [17][18][19] to 
compare with Naïve Bayes Classifier. 
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